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THE 'S' OF 'SECURITY': EUROPE ON THE ROAD TO GMES 
THE 'S' OF 'SECURIT~":  EUROPE ON THE 
ROAD TO GMES 
Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk* 
1. Towards Global Monitoring for the Environment 
and Security (GMES) 
In November 2001, by means of a Resolution1 the European 
Union officially launched 'Global Monitoring for the Environment 
and Security'(GMES), the second European space programme 
(after Galileo2) essentially driven by the Union. The Resolution 
inter alia calls for the European Commission to coordinate with 
* Director Space Law Research, International Institute of Air and Space 
Law, Leiden University. This Article forms part of the Leiden Faculty of 
Law research programme "Securing the rule of law in a world of multilevel 
jurisdiction: coherence, institutional principles and fundamental rights". 
1.  Council Resolution on the launch of the initial period of global monitoring 
for environment and security (GMES), of 13 November 2001; OJ C 35014 
(2001). See further Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council - Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security (GMES): Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65 
final, of 3 February 2004. 
2. See for Galileo: Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the 
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), of 19 
December 1994; OJ C 37912 (1994); Council Resolution on the involvement 
of Europe in a new generation of satellite navigation services - Galileo- 
Definition phase, of 19 July 1999; OJ C 221101 (1 999); Council Regulation 
setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 
2002; OJ L 13811 (2002); Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council - Integration of the EGNOS programme 
in the Galileo programme, COM(2003) 123 final, of 19 March 2003; and 
Council Regulation on the establishment of structures for the management 
of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes, No. 132112004/EC, 
of 12 July 2004; OJ L 24611 (2004). 
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the European Space Agency (ESA) the realisation of "an 
operational and autonomous European capability for global 
monitoring for environment and security" by 2008, crucially 
involving a satellite s y ~ t e r n . ~  
Relevant data which are to form part of such a capability 
may, in principle, come from a number of different sources: 
space-based data, airborne data, and in situ-generated data of 
different terrestrial origin. However, non-space data almost by 
definition are generated within one national state or other, which 
means that applicable law and regulation in principle differs - 
and sometimes hugely so - from state to state, whilst generally 
not having developed with any specific consideration for the 
types of data involved in GMES either. 
By contrast, outer space is an international area outside of 
any state's international individual jurisdiction4, where operational 
paradigms of a principally international, even global character 
apply. This also has a profound impact on the legal issues 
closely connected to the generation of space-based data, as 
opposed to data generated in other modes where national sovereignty 
remains fully visible. Moreover, the space-part is clearly the most 
distinguishing factor of any GMES operation, in view also of 
the envisaged fundamental role of satellites, ESA5 and likely 
3. Para. (3), Council Resolution of 13 November 2001. 
4. See esp. Art. 11, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, 
done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 
205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 
1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967). 
5. The European Space Agency (ESA) was established by the Convention 
for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter ESA 
Convention), Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 
14 ILM 864 (1975). 
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EUMETSAT6 in this context. 
For the purpose of GMES the establishment of a core entity 
provisionally labelled 'GMES Authority' is envisaged. Legal 
basis, status, role and competencies of such a body are yet to 
be determined. The documents so far referring to such a GMES 
Authority generally discuss various types of bodies or organs 
that can be established under EC law. Thus, mention has been 
made of such options as a Joint Undertaking7, an Executive 
Agencyg, a Community Agency9 or a Joint Technology Initiative 
6. The European Meteorological Satellite Organisation EUMETSAT was 
established by the Convention for the Establishment of a European 
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), 
Geneva, done 24 May 1983, entered into force 19 June 1986; as amended 
14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July 1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law 
- Basic Legal Documents, C.III.l; 44 ZLW 68 (1995). 
7. Under Art. 171, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated 
Version) (hereafter EC Treaty); OJ C 325133 (2002). The example usually 
referred to, of course, is the Galileo Joint Undertaking currently preparing 
the Galileo operational phases. See e.g. Communication of 3 February 
2004, p. 17. 
8. Cf. Council Regulation laying down the status for executive agencies to 
be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes, 
No. 58120031EC, of 19 December 2002; OJ L 1111 (2003); as well as, by 
way of example, Commission Decision setting up an executive agency, the 
'Intelligent Energy Executive Agency', to manage Community action in 
the field of energy in application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 5812003, 
No. 2004/20/EC, of 23 December 2003; OJ L 5185 (2004); and Commission 
Decision setting up an executive agency, the 'Executive Agency for the 
Public Health Programme', for the management of Community action in 
the field of public health - pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 
5812003, No. 2004/858/EC, of 15 December 2004; OJ L 369173 (2004). 
9. Cf. e.g. the European Environment Agency (EEA), established by Council 
Regulation on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and 
the European Environment Information and Observation Network, No. 
1210/90/EEC, of 7 May 1990; OJ L 12011 (1990); the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA), established by Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing 
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A final important point, of a more background/political nature 
but so far left largely unattended (at least in public discourse) 
concerns the involvement of GMES in security issues, in the 
field of outer space where traditionally 'defence' and 'security' 
have never been very far away. Whilst 'security' is broadly 
conceived so as to include civil security, involving not only 
terrorist threats but also the threats posed by natural or man-made 
disasters, it certainly also includes the more traditional security 
issues of a military and defence nature. GMES, whatever the 
'GMES Authority' will come to look like, will have the European 
Union for a father and ESA for a mother. 
Here, it must be noted that ESA, in accordance with its 
constitutive Convention, is supposed to "provide for and to 
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among 
European States in space research and technology and their 
space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific 
purposes and for operational space applications  system^".^^ 
Traditionally this has been interpreted as a ban on ESA 
involvement in any space activities of a military or defence 
nature, but it may be noted that already with Galileo that 
interpretation is shifting to a broader interpretation allowing 
such involvement, at least as long as of a purely defensive 
nature (alternatively being sanctioned at the UN-level).12 
a European Aviation Safety Agency, No. 1592/2002/EC, of 15 July 2002; 
OJ L 24011 (2002); and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 
established by Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, No. 140612002/EC, of 
27 June 2002; OJ L 20811 (2002). 
10. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - European Space Policy - Preliminary Elements, SEC(2005) 
664, Brussels, 23 May 2005, COM(2005) 208 final. 
11. Art. 11, ESA Convention; emphasis added. 
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Similarly, the European Union is formally supposed to limit 
its activities to those not involving pure defence and military 
issues. The EU-pillar established to deal with common foreign 
and security policy is a straightforward intergovernmental 
construction, with at best a marginal role for the Commission 
as supposed guardian of the overarching European interest and 
no role for the elaborate legislative, adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction developed in the context of the EC Treaty.13 In 
Europe, matters of international cooperation in the areas of 
defence and security have so far been essentially dealt with in 
the context of NAT014 or at best the Western European Union 
(WEU)15 - which, interestingly enough, has been drawn closer 
into the EU structures over the past few years. Also for the 
Union however, Galileo represents the first case where a more 
active and leading role in defence and security matters is 
12. One of the key services which Galileo is going to offer concerns the 
Public-Regulated Service (PRS), which is going to be encrypted and provided 
with a certain measure of technical robustness against interference, and is 
intended for usage by government services or specific government-monitored 
or government-protected services (such as telecommunication or energy 
networks) only. Several EU member states have already indicated that they 
envisage usage of the PRS also by their respective militaries, though this 
has not been generally accepted yet. See on the set-up of Galileo and its 
services e.g. the author's Liability for Global Navigation Satellite Services: 
A Comparative Analysis of GPS and Galileo, 30 Journal of Space Law 
(2004), 145-52. 
13. Cf. e.g. Artt. 2-5, EC Treaty, referring to the tasks and objectives of the 
Community, not offering any, even indirect, reference to matters of a 
defence or military nature, whilst also indicating that it "shall act within 
the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein". 
14. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established by the 
North Atlantic Treaty, Brussels, done 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 
August 1949; 34 UNTS 243; TIAS No. 1964; 63 Stat. 2241. 
15. The Western European Union (WEU) was established in its original version 
by the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective 
Self-Defence, Brussels, done 17 March 1948, entered into force 25 August 
1948, and repeatedly amended in the decades since. 
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becoming acceptable and accepted - with GMES following 
closely upon its heels. 
Such growing involvement of both ESA and the Union in 
defence and security matters raises a number of questions as 
regards the legal issues playing in those areas. How has the 
possibility of GMES-generated data being of fundamental military 
or security interest been dealt with? How is a proper and 
acceptable measure of access to such data taken care of, balancing 
security and military interests of GMES-backing states with the 
professed contribution of GMES data to enhanced environmental 
and civil security calling for wide access possibilities? 
The current article raises two sets of issues from this 
perspective. On the one hand, there are general security and 
dual-use issues, where existing international arrangements may 
have a bearing on the legal context within which certain GMES 
services might be provided. On the other hand, an international 
regime exists which is applicable to access to data resulting 
from remote sensing which may have its effects on GMES, and 
the possibilities to do what it is being established for, as well. 
2. Security and dual-use issues 
2.1. The Wassenaar Arrangement 
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a formally non-binding 
arrangement on export controls for conventional weapons and 
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.16 It was designed to 
16. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement), 
Wassenaar, done 19 December 1995, effective 12 July 1996. Currently, the 
following states are participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
with the states being members of the Union and/or ESA so indicated: Argentina, 
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promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms, dual-use goods and dual-use technologies. 
Participating states commit themselves to ensure through 
national policies and, where appropriate, national regulations that 
cross-border transfers of these items do not contribute to the 
development or enhancement of military capabilities in states 
not participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement.I7 
The decision to actually allow or deny transfer of any item, 
however, remains the sole responsibility of each individual 
participating state.Ig Thus, also, export controls differ from state 
to state in terms of documentation required, license fees, length 
of time to get a license, and duration of validity of the license. 
The participating states only agree to notify transfers and 
denials, as well as to control (transfers of) all items in the List 
of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the List of Munitions, 
annexed to the Arrangement.19 Controls do not apply to technology 
or software in the public domain, to basic scientific research 
or to the minimum necessary information for patent applications. 
The Lists have two annexes, of sensitive items and of very 
sensitive items respectively, to which different levels of control 
should be applied, and are reviewed regularly to reflect 
Australia, Austria (EU & ESA), Belgium (EU & ESA), Bulgaria (EU), 
Canada. Croatia. Czech Republic (EU), Denmark (EU & ESA), Estonia 
(EU), Finland (EU & ESA), France (EU & ESA), Germany (EU & ESA), 
Greece (EU & ESA), Hungary (EU), Ireland (EU & ESA), Italy (EU & 
ESA), Japan, Latvia (EU), Lithuania (EU), Luxembourg (EU & ESA), 
Malta (EU). the Netherlands (EU & ESA), New Zealand, Norway (ESA), 
Poland (EU), Portugal (EU & ESA), Republic of Korea, Romania (EU), 
the Russian Federation, Slovakia (EU), Slovenia (EU), South Africa, Spain 
(EU & ESA), Sweden (EU & ESA), Switzerland (ESA), Turkey, Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom (EU & ESA), and the United States. 
17. See Art. I ( l ) ,  Wassenaar Arrangement. 
18. See Art. 11(3), Wassenaar Arrangement. 
19. See Artt. II(4), I I I ( l ) ,  Wassenaar Arrangement; also Appendix 5. 
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technological developments. 
Finally, the participating states agree to exchange general 
information on risks associated with transfers of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies in order to consider, 
where necessary, the scope for coordinating national control 
policies to combat these risks.20 
As to GMES, this means inter alia that the products and 
services envisaged by GMES might well turn out to be, explicitly 
but especially implicitly, included in the relevant List, resulting 
in potential obstacles to distribution of relevant GMES-generated 
information for the purposes of the environment and security. 
Much depends here on whether the recipients of GMES-generated 
information would be parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement 
themselves, so as to 'bind' them to applicable rules with regard 
to transfers outside the group of parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
2.2. Regulation 133412000 
The Wassenaar Arrangement as such does not recognise the 
European Union in any substantive manner even as all of its 
members, with the single exception of Cyprus, are participating 
states. Partially as a result thereof, within Europe the same 
issue was also dealt with in a more classical, legally binding 
format by means of Regulation 133412000, which sets up a 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, 
including cryptographic items, for the Union itself.21 An 
20. See Art. IV( I ), Wassenaar Arrangement. 
21. Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of  dual-use items and technology (hereafter Regulation 1334/2000). 
No. 1334/2000/EC, o f  22 June 2000; OJ L 15911 (2000). The Regulation 
has been amended and updated by Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 133412000 with regard to intra-Community transfers and exports 
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authorisation is required for export of the dual-use items listed 
in Annex I (which is essentially similar to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement's List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies). 
If the prospective exporter is aware that an item might be 
used in a way proscribed by the Regulation, it is bound to 
apply the applicable provisions, even if it is not listed in Annex 
1.22 Under the Regulation, export includes transmission of 
software or technology by electronic media, fax or telephone 
to a destination outside the Union. 
As with the Wassenaar Arrangement, under Regulation 
133412000 the responsibility for deciding on applications for 
export authorisations lies with the national authorities. Some 
items on the List of Dual-Use Items and Technology (Annex 
1) are not controlled if they accompany the user and are for 
the user's personal use: Regulation 133412000 "does not apply 
to the supply of services or the transmission of technology if 
that supply or transmission involves cross-border movement of 
natural  person^".'^ 
The Regulation establishes a Community General Export 
Authorisation (CGEA) for certain exports by means of Annex 
of dual-use items and technology, No. 288912000/EC, of 22 December 
2000; OJ L 336114 (2000); Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
No. 133412000 with regard to the list of controlled dual-use items and 
technology when exported. No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; OJ L 65/19 
(2001); and Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) 
No. 133412000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports 
of dual-use iteins and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC, of 20 November 
2001; OJ L 33811 (2001). The last Regulation updates and replaces the 
Annexes to Regulation 133412000 in order to take account of, inter alia, 
changes adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement plenary session in December 
2000. 
22. See Art. 4, Regulation 133412000. 
23 Art. 3(3), Regulation 133412000. 
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11. Annex 11, Part 1, specifies that the CGEA is possible for 
all dual-use items listed in Annex I, except those specified in 
Annex 11, Part 2, dealing with the more security-sensitive items. 
National export authorities are not automatically obliged to 
provide a CGEA, however, and, in any event, the exporter must 
comply with the reporting requirements set out in Annex 11, 
Part 3 .  
For all other items, authorisation shall be granted, if so, by 
the member state where the exporter is located.24 This authorisation 
may be an individual, global or general authorisation. Member 
states must maintain or introduce in national legislation the 
possibility of granting a global authorisation to a specific exporter 
for dual-use items valid for export to one or more specified 
countries. The competent authorities may still refuse to grant an 
export authorisation and may annul, suspend, modify or revoke 
an export authorisation which they have already granted.25 Finally, 
exporters are required to keep detailed records of their exports. 
Once more, with a view to GMES, the Regulation may turn 
out to unduly and/or inadvertently obstruct the distribution of 
GMES-generated products and services. Those products and 
services may, certainly prima facie, be seen as dealing with 
dual-use and/or sensitive software or information, and, wherever 
this applies, the key players in GMES - notably the Commission 
and the EU member states - may soon be looking for ways to 
ensure exclusion of key GMES products and services from the 
scope of the Regulation's regime. 
24. See Art. 6, Regulation 133412000. 
25. See Art. 9, Regulation 133412000. 
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2.3. The United Nations system for international security 
Finally, reference should be made briefly to the general global 
system for dealing with international security issues, as developed 
in the context of the United Nations. Under the UN Charter the 
United Nations has been given the major task by the member 
states to try and establish alternatively preserve international 
peace and security, within the competencies allotted to it.26 
Those competencies to a certain extent rest with the General 
Assembly, which has the possibility to issue (non-binding) 
Resolutions as well as to assert a role in despatching peace-keeping 
or peace-making forces, but especially with the Security Council, 
which has the power to issue binding Resolutions and initiate 
mandatory processes in this regard. 
Under this system the Security Council may, for example, 
impose boycotts, economic blockades or even authorise hll-fledged 
military actions if it considers international peace and security 
sufficiently threatened.Z7 Throughout the last decades, these 
powers have been used in such cases as the Yugoslav civil wars 
(vis-a-vis Serbia in particular), the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait in 
1990, and the military actions against Afghanistan in 2002 and 
Iraq in 2003. 
The main point to keep in mind for GMES is that, should 
any such measures be imposed by the Security Council in the 
future, the relevant GMES actors would be bound to comply 
with them as well. It could be imagined in particular that certain 
data products or services would not be allowed to be delivered 
to certain parties, or that certain international cooperation 
26. Charter of the United Nations (hereafter UN Charter), San Francisco, done 
26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; USTS 993; 59 Stat. 
1031; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; ATS 1945 No. 1. 
2? Cf. Artt. 41, 42, UN charter. 
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ventures with certain parties on GMES-related issues would 
have to be suspended or cancelled in cases where the Security 
Council would determine a threat to international peace and 
security to exist. 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
The 'S' of GMES results in several issues of security and 
dual-use character requiring discussion in this context. Data 
generated by GMES, or information based on such data, could 
very well be subjected to the legal regime, summary as it may 
be, applicable to international transboundary movement of 
security-sensitive information or become involved in international 
actions trying to preserve international peace and security. 
In particular once GMES starts generating its 'own' data 
this might well entail substantial limitations to GMES operations. 
In the last resort, however this should not qualify as much of 
a real obstacle in the way of GMES. The Union and its member 
states were actively engaged in matters relating to sensitive 
dual-use technology transfers from the beginning, and have also 
played an active role in protecting perceived security interests 
elsewhere, such as in the United Nations. It is only the natural 
course of things that GMES will not be allowed to somehow 
put those interests at risk by moving beyond the parameters 
resulting from the politico-legal environment described above. 
GMES might well work as a tool and a catalyst for further 
European involvement in such areas, and thus evolve into the 
main pillar under such involvement, at least as far as outer space 
is concerned - that is: if at least a proper, transparent, coherent 
and efficient institutional framework for legal decision-making 
will be established. 
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3. Access to remote sensing data 
3.1. The international regime for access to remote sensing 
data 
One of the most fundamental rules of space law is the 
principle of freedom of space activitiesm2* Consequently, using 
satellites for remote sensing purposes is basically allowed. The 
Outer Space Treaty itself only provides for a few rather general 
principles to which any space activities should conform, such 
as international cooperation, mandatory supervision and authorisation 
of private space activities (for which a state is held responsible 
without further qualification), and bona Jide efforts to minimise 
harmful effects of one's space activities, for example as to the 
environment .29 
Most notably, Article I calls for the "exploration and use of 
outer space" to be "for the benefits and in the interests of all 
countries"; Article 111 requires such activities to be "in the 
interest of maintaining international peace and security"; and 
Article IV imposes certain limits upon the freedom to use outer 
space for military purposes. Under the latter Article the stationing 
of weapons of mass-destruction in outer space is prohibited, 
whereas the Moon and other celestial bodies should only be 
used "exclusively for peaceful purposes". In conjunction with 
the former clause, the Test Ban Treaties furthermore prohibit 
the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space.30 
The specific issue of remote sensing, as a sub-set of space 
activities, at the global level has only been dealt with in any 
detail by UN General Assembly Resolution 41/65, adopted by 
consensus on 3 December 1986.31 Whilst the Resolution per se 
28. See also Art. I, Outer Space Treaty. 
29. See, resp., Artt. 111, VI, IX, Outer Space Treaty. 
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does not constitute binding law, its adoption by consensus, as 
well as the general respect accorded to its contents, leads most 
experts toxonsider those contents to reflect customary international 
law.32 Thus, the - relatively scarce - state practice in terms of 
express national regulations and policies on access to remote 
sensing data confirms that states generally recognise the validity 
of the Principles as binding law as such, even if the interpretations 
may sometimes differ considerably. One may for example refer 
here to the main issue of discussion under the Resolution, which 
is that of 'non-discriminatory access' to data33 - which might 
at least prima facie impose obligations also upon GMES which 
considerably limit certain elements of its envisaged activities 
from a legal perspective. 
The level of agreement on this 'non-discriminatory access' principle 
and what it means in detail is not particularly i m p r e ~ s i v e . ~ ~  
More importantly, certainly in the European context, it was not 
at all considering the possible use of data for military or even 
security purposes, whether in the context of the non-discriminatory 
30. See Art. I(l.a), Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Under Water, Moscow, done 5 August 1963, entered 
into force 10 October 1963; 480 UNTS 43; TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313; 
UKTS 1964 No. 3; ATS 1963 No. 26; Art. I(1), Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, New York, done 24 September 1996, not yet entered into force. 
31. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space 
(hereafter Resolution 41/65), UNGA Res. 41/65, of 3 December 1986; UN 
Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.l, at 43; 25 ILM 1334 (1986). 
32. See e.g. C.Q. Christol, Space Law - P~ist, Present and Future (1991), 73; 
K.R. Sridhara Murthi. Space Communications and Remote Sensing Applications 
in Asia and the Pacific: Technology and Legal Perspectives, in 2004 Space 
Law Conference (2004), 244; M .  Williams, The UN Principles on Remote 
Sensing Today, in Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Colloquium on the LOW 
of Outer Space (2006), 3-5. 
33. Cf. Princ. XII, Resolution 41/65, which will be analysed in more detail 
iri$a, in para. 3.2. 
34. Cf. e.g. the author's Non-discriminatory data dissemination in practice, in 
Earth Observation Data Policy and Europe ( E d .  R. Harris)(ZOO2), 41-50. 
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access principle or even outside of it. 
ESA for example had undertaken several comprehensive 
satellite remote programmes until the advent of GMES, inclusive 
of satellite operations, data handling and data distribution, such 
as the two European Remote Sensing Satellites ERS-1 and 
ERS-2, and the more recent Envisat, and published quite extended 
documents on the data policy to be applied.35 
In none of those cases however, did such a data policy make 
any specific reference to specific security-related reasons for 
non-disclosure of data, albeit that such non-disclosure could, if 
need be, come to be excused as not falling within the scope 
of non-discrimination. Moreover, it should be reiterated that so 
far ESA has not been mandated, or seen, to be involved in 
straightforward security-related activities. Finally, at the time 
of neither ERS nor Envisat data policy drafting, was the level 
of resolution taken into consideration such that militarily-relevant 
usage seemed around the corner - by default any unforeseen 
military customers respectively usages for example would 
probably have to be treated as commercial customers respectively 
usages. 
By way of comparison, however, also in the case of the 
United States, where there would be no principled obstacles to 
involvement of remote sensing in security-related areas, this 
conclusion would apply. Neither in the United States Land 
Remote Sensing Policy Act of 199236 nor in any subsequent 
data policy documents was reference made to security let alone 
35. E.g. for Envisat: the Envisat Data Policy, ESAIPB-E0(97)57 rev. 3, Paris, 
19 February 1998, drafted by the Earth Observation Programme Board of 
ESA. See further G.  Kohlhammer, The Envisat Exploitation Policy, in ESA 
Bzrlletin 106 (June 2001), 128-33. 
36. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Public Law 102-555, 102nd Congress, 
H.R. 6133, 28 October 1992; 15 U.S.C. 5601; 106 Stat. 4163. 
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military usage of data in direct reference to the principle of 
non-discriminatory access - whilst such reference was made at 
a considerable number of other places in those documents. 
Thus, the examples of two rather distinct key players in the 
world-wide application of, for example, the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
already show a certain acknowledgment of the authority of 
Resolution 41/65 in this field, but without any connection at 
all to security-related remote sensing activities. This then can 
only be interpreted - with reference also to Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the fundamental principle of freedom 
of space exploration and use pronounced by it - as meaning 
that such security-related usage of remote sensing data does 
not fall within the scope of the 'non-discriminatory access' principle. 
In other words: one does not need to be bothered by this 
principle when deciding to (not) disseminate certain data from 
remote sensing satellites which are clearly in the military and 
security domain - something reinforced of course by the 
confinement, in the last resort, of the Resolution to remote sensing 
"for the purpose of improving natural resources management, 
land use and the protection of the en~ironment".~~ 
3.2. The substance of Resolution 41/65 
Analysis of the substance of Resolution 41/65 further confirms 
the above conclusion. For a start, it acknowledges the freedom of 
remote sensing activities, as one particular manifestation of the 
freedom of space activities subject only to international law.38 
Further to this, the Resolution provides some important parameters 
for remote sensing activities. 
37. Princ. I(a), Resolution 4 1/65. 
38. See Princ. 111, Resolution 41/65. 
THE 'S' OF 'SECURITY': EUROPE ON THE ROAD TO GMES 
Firstly, it should be reiterated that the Resolution applies 
to remote sensing activities "for the purpose of improving 
natural resources management, land use and the protection of 
the en~i ronment" .~~ Since such usage arguably would not require 
the quality of spatial resolution of better than in the range of 
10 metres, any very high resolution (VHR) data issues might 
fall outside the scope of the Resolution. Following from this, 
somewhat narrow, definition of remote sensing for the purposes 
of the Resolution, it excludes many activities relevant from a 
security perspective from its scope. 
Then, Principle I1 provides that "Remote sensing activities 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic, social or 
scientific and technological development, and taking into particular 
consideration the needs of the developing countries". Actually, 
this Principle very much supports the general establishment of 
GMES, although it also raises some questions as to the extent 
in which such benefits are to be created in a mandatory fashion. 
Here, the frequently-found and rather general reference to 
"the benefit and (...) interest of all countries" with special 
consideration for the developing countries was developed further 
by means of another UN Resolution in 1996." This Resolution 
left complete freedom to states "to determine all aspects" of 
such cooperation, and furthermore repeatedly referred to the 
requirement of "an equitable and mutually acceptable basis" for 
any activities undertaken in its implementat i~n.~~ 
39. Princ. ](a), Resolution 41/65. 
40. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Resolution 5 1/122), 
UNGA Res. 511122, of 13 December 1996; XXII-I Annals of Air and 
Space Law (1997), at 556; 46 ZLW (1997). at 236. 
41. See Princc. 2, 3, Resolution 511122. 
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Principle IV of Resolution 41/65 then deals with the core 
issue of satellite remote sensing: the dilemma between the 
freedom of use of outer space, in its particular manifestation 
of freedom of information-gathering making use of satellites, 
and the principle of sovereignty of states over their own territory, 
more in particular over their own wealth and natural resources. 
These two concepts collide where the 'sensed state' finds itself 
in a situation that a 'sensing state' might obtain valuable 
information, especially in economic terms, with regard to the 
territory of the 'sensed state' which that state itself does not possess. 
A balance of sorts has been established by the Resolution, 
which in the final analysis tilts towards the freedom of remote 
sensing activities. The principle of full and permanent sovereignty, 
it is true, is to be respected, consequently legitimate rights and 
interests of the 'sensed state' shall not be harmed, and also the 
benefit and interest of all countries shall be taken into account 
(that is, including those of the 'sensed state').42 All this, however, 
does not alter the fact that the 'sensed state' neither has a veto 
to prevent it from being 'sensed', nor an exclusive, free or 
preferential right of access to the data, nor is it entitled 
automatically to becoming a partner in the relevant remote 
sensing  operation^.^^ This becomes especially clear when these 
principles are seen in conjunction with Principle XII, since for 
the purpose of a particular set of remote sensing data concerning 
its territory the 'sensed state' is no different from any other 
state interested in such data. 
Principle XI1 namely provides: "As soon as the primary data 
and the processed data concerning the territory under its 
jurisdiction are produced, the sensed State shall have access to 
them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost 
M See Princ. IV, Resolution 41/65. 
43. Cf. Princ. XIII, Resolution 41/65. 
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terms. The sensed State shall also have access to the available 
analysed information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction 
in the possession of any State participating in remote sensing 
activities on the same basis and terms, particular regard being 
given to the needs and interests of the developing countries."44 
In terms of further legal parameters to the freedom to 
distribute remote sensing data or not, finally two further Principles 
contained in Resolution 41/65 are of special importance with 
a view to GMES, even though such importance is more directly 
related to the 'E' of 'environment' than to the 'S' of 'security'. 
Firstly, Principle X provides: "Remote sensing shall promote 
the protection of the Earth's natural environment. To this end, 
States participating in remote sensing activities that have identified 
information in their possession that can be used to avert any 
phenomenon harmful to the Earth's natural environment shall 
disclose such information to States concerned." 
Secondly, in rather similar fashion Principle XI provides: 
"Remote sensing shall promote the protection of mankind from 
natural disasters. To this end, States participating in remote 
sensing activities that have identified processed data and analysed 
information in their possession that may be useful to States 
affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending 
natural disasters, shall transmit such data and information to 
States concerned as promptly as possible." 
Principle XI thus largely mirrors Principle X; the latter 
dealing with man-originating threats to the natural environment 
of the Earth, the former with nature's threats against mankind. 
The main noticeable difference with Principle X is that Principle 
XI explicitly applies to "processed data" in addition to "analyzed 
44. ~ ~ n ~ h a s ' i s  added. 
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information", as opposed to mere "information". 
Neither of them, finally, alter the conclusion that military 
and other traditional security issues were not addressed at all 
by the Resolution, which therefore cannot provide any specific 
guidance regarding how GMES data of such a nature are to 
distributed, read handled. This leaves GMES authorities, at least 
as far as the Resolution is concerned, with the principal freedom 
to decide on any distribution policy of data for military and 
defence purposes as they see fit; no obligation of non-discriminatory 
access, whatever its precise scope and reach, can interfere therewith. 
3.3. The Charter on Space and Major Disasters 
Of major impact in some of the areas where GMES is 
going to become active, the Charter on Space and Major 
Disasters focuses directly and exclusively on the tnitigation of 
major disasters and their harmful eff'ects without creating any 
new international o r g a n i s a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The Charter was established by a number of leading space 
agencies with operational remote sensing capabilities, initiated 
by ESA, one of the two 'founding fathers' of GMES, and the 
French space agency CNES in 1999 as a follow-up to the 
Unispace IIT Conference, where the potential of earth observation 
in the context of major disasters was prominently 
It  also represents a specific manifestatic~n of such general 
principles of space law as pertaining to the benefit of all 
countries and the requirement to allow free and uninhibited 
- 
45. See http::iwww.disasterschartzr.org:inain,~.e.html. 'The full name is "C'harrer 
On Cooper:ition To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities In 
'The Event Of Katural Or Technological Disasters". 
46. See e.g. Report oi'the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration 
and Peaceful Uses of Outcr Space, A;CONF. 18416 (1999). 33-7, 64. 
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access to data if natural or man-made disasters are at hand, as 
discussed above in the context of Resolution 4 1/65.47 
In due course, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 
Indian Space Agency ISRO, the Argentine National Commission 
on Space Activities CONAE and most recently the Japanese 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) and the Disaster Monitoring 
Constellation (DMC) joined, so that the Charter currently counts 
nine full-fledged partners.48 
The Charter, declared formally operational on 1 November 
2000, aims at providing a unified system of space data acquisition 
and delivery to those affected by natural or man-made disasters 
-and thus is clearly operative in the same areas GMES 
envisages to address. Each member agency has committed 
resources to support the provisions of the Charter and thus 
helps to mitigate the effects of disasters on human life and 
property: ESA provides data from ERS and Envisat, CNES from 
the SPOT satellites, CSA from the Radarsat satellites, ISRO 
from the IRS satellites, NOAA from the POES and GOES 
satellites and CONAE from the SAC-C satellite. 
Article 6(1) of the Charter provides that requests to adhere 
to it may be made by any space system operator or space agency 
with access to space facilities agreeing to contribute to the 
commitments made by the parties. In other words, it is a de 
facto prerequisite for membership to possess the capability to 
operate satellite systems. Such capability is not necessarily limited 
to earth observation satellites or instruments; "space systems for 
observation, meteorology, positioning, telecommunications and 
47. See Art. I, Outer Space Treaty; Princc. X, XI, Resolution 41/65. 
118. See http://www.disasterscharter.org/participants~e.html. 
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TV broadcasting or elements thereof such as on-board instruments, 
terminals, beacons, receivers, VSAT's and archives" are also 
a c ~ e p t a b l e . ~ ~  
Upon request by a "beneficiary body", the member agencies 
acquire the data of the area affected by the disaster from their 
satellites, process the data into images, analyse them further if 
necessary, and distribute the resulting information free of charge 
to those states affected by the disaster via "associated bodiesws0. 
It is explicitly provided that a state affected by disaster which 
requests access to certain data needs to contact relevant associated 
bodies - or "cooperating bodiesW5l acting in partnership with 
an associated body. 
The effective determination of which satellites are to provide 
data for a particular disaster is facilitated by prior scenario-writing, 
anticipating which data and information would be useful for 
which types of crisis. The parties shall together analyse recent 
crises for which space facilities could have provided or did 
provide effective assistance to the authorities and rescue services 
concerned, draw conclusions and prepare sample response plans 
for such future events.52 A scenario covers such issues as the 
type of sensors effective for specific disasters and selection 
49. Art. 1, Charter on Space and Major Disasters. 
5U. Art. 5(2), Charter on Space and Major Disasters; an "associated body" is 
"an institution or service responsible for rescue and civil protection, defence 
and security under the authority of a State whose jurisdiction covers an 
agency or operator that is a party to the Charter". 
51. Cooperating bodies include the European Union, the other 'founding father' 
of GMES, the UN Bureau for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
and other recognized national or international organizations with which the 
parties may have cause to cooperate in pursuance of the Charter. A 
"cooperating body" does not operate a space system but acts in partnership 
with an associated body which does; see Art. 3(5), Charter on Space and 
Major Disasters. 
52. See Art. 4(2), Charter on Space and Major Disasters. 
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criteria for use of a specific satellite. 
The Charter has so far helped and will continue to be of 
help in a large number of rather varying events; not only in 
developing but certainly also in developed countries. With a 
view to GMES then, the main consequence following from the 
development of the Charter concerns the respective roles of 
ESA and the European Union, which make it rather likely for 
GMES to become closely involved in Charter activities, or even 
actually take over the implementation of European contributions 
to Charter operations in the future. As the Charter, however, 
operates on a 'best efforts' basis and legally speaking does not 
constitute a comprehensive closed and binding system, it would 
be rather unlikely for it to result in obligations for GMES to 
disseminate data in case that would result in a threat to the 
security of the European states involved. Rather, GMES would 
more often than not be helpful for those states to further the 
cause of the Charter in bundling efficiently relevant space activities. 
3.4. General humanitarian obligations 
Both the international space law-rules pertinent for remote 
sensing and the Charter on Space and Major Disasters effectively 
are representations of a broader, general international law-duty 
for states to assist other states and their peoples in cases of 
larger humanitarian disasters, whether natural or man-made. As 
to the latter, understandably from a realistic politico-legal 
perspective but of course very unfortunately, these exclude those 
man-made disasters created by wars, persecution and other forms 
of violence, since in particular those states where events in 
these categories take place are generally unwilling to have other 
states come to the rescue. merely on humanitarian grounds. 
Since precisely those last categories of man-made disasters 
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are at the heart of the 'S' of 'security', reference must still be 
made (even if briefly) to the existence of these underlying 
general humanitarian principles which do, in principle, apply 
to security issues as well. Though they would apply also in 
cases not covered by either the international space law-regime 
or the Charter (whether ratione materine or ratione personae), 
and as such would have a general bearing on a number of 
GMES activities, their main disadvantage from a more practical 
perspective is their very broad and vague content. At every 
turn a different set of issues and situations are at stake, making 
it very difficult to determine what, in any particular case, such 
general humanitarian duties would amount to in terms of, for 
example, concrete actions or measures. 
Thus, to give one particularly interesting and illustrative 
example, the obligations to provide data to a sensed state could 
well come into conflict with the obligation to act for humanitarian 
considerations. This would arise in a case where refugees were 
fleeing persecution by a ruling regime in a given state, and the 
location of such refugees would be of equal interest to the aid 
agencies and to the ruling authorities - in the latter case for 
all the wrong reasons. 
For that reason, these obligations should be best perceived 
as obligations-of-effort, as opposed to obligations-of-result. Their 
practical reach remains to be determined for each specific 
instance, and in the last resort they may serve more as guidelines 
to prefer one course of action over another if, all other things 
essentially equal, the first course would be more in tune with 
such humanitarian obligations. 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
For purposes of realising GMES, especially the general 
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international law-regime on access to remote sensing data and 
the more specific requirements under the Charter resting upon 
key GMES players such as ESA should be taken into account. 
In the second phase of GMES this would also apply to any 
satellite data directly generated from 'GMES satellites'. These 
regimes would considerably limit the discretion of any key 
GMES entity in deciding whether and how to distribute certain 
data under GMES. 
Whoever would be in the driver's seat for GMES satellite 
activities should be aware of these regimes, and monitor their 
further development as to substantial effects on his own discretion 
with respect to GMES data distribution. This reverts back to 
the roles of, firstly, any 'GMES Authority' to be developed, 
and secondly, the Commission andlor the EU member states. 
Once more, however, upon closer look the existing regimes do 
not in any essential measure provide obstacles for GMES - on 
the contrary, it would be surprising if the rather loosely-formulated 
restrictions to the freedom to (not) disseminate certain data 
would suddenly be applied very rigorously to a system which 
is generally designed to work in the favour of mankind's need 
for environmental and other security. The proof of the pudding 
is in the eating, however; and for the pudding to be digestible, 
a proper, transparent, coherent and efficient institutional framework 
for decision-making on GMES and GMES-related security and 
military issues is requisite. 
4. Towards properly integrating the 'S' into GMES 
In the final analysis, it seems that GMES will not meet with 
many undue legal obstacles coming from the two areas of 
security issues respectively data access. The inherent limitations 
coming from the former area are already well-known to the 
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member states of the Union and ESA behind GMES, and 
moreover leave some room for improvement when it comes to 
developing a proper balance between security interests in the 
traditional sense - which generally call for restriction of access 
to, and usage of, data - and security interests in the more 
modem sense, which generally would call for as widespread 
availability and usage of data. The nascent legal regime developing 
in the latter area on the other hand seem to be hardly relevant 
so far, in legal terms, for the issues surrounding the involvement 
of GMES in any type of security issues. 
Thus, the issues are more of a fundamentally political nature, 
referring to the acceptability of growing involvement of both 
the Union and ESA in areas close to, even overlapping traditional 
areas of defence and military security; a development already 
gaining steam under the existing legallinstitutional European 
construct, but soon requiring a more solid and appropriately 
renewed legal/institutional basis. 
Rather then being fundamentally hindered by the existing 
rules of the road or in danger of operating against main relevant 
premises and principles - of which this article focused on the 
two areas coming closest at the moment to an international 
legal regime - GMES would likely even grow into a component 
part of that legal/institutional regime, and thus help to shape 
future legal developments in this field. 
It might well do so, for example, by acting as a counterweight 
to Wassenaar-type of restrictions on data access, as they might 
be perceived by non-participating states from a negative 
perspective, and come to represent the 'sharing side' of European 
space efforts rather than the 'excluding side'. Similarly, GMES 
may help to develop the loose and overtly-political regime on 
data access into a more legalistically-phrased, clear-cut and 
coherent legal regime, by its own practices as they will evolve, 
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and equally may help to further boost the benefits of the Charter 
on Space and Major Disasters to mankind. 
To what extent GMES will actually be able to achieve such 
contributions then crucially depends upon the governance 
structure to be developed for GMES by the European member 
states with a view to the global context in which GMES is 
going to operate, including the Global Earth Observation System 
of Systems (GEOSS). Whatever its precise outlines, whether 
Joint Undertaking, Executive Agency, Community Agency, JTI 
or even a newly established international entity; it should be 
properly structured in terms of size and competencies, transparent 
in its decision-making and balancing of military security 
respectively environmental and civil security interests (wherever 
the two may run counter to each other), coherent in making 
certain the outcome binds - or at least guides - all European 
stakeholders, and efficient in not reinventing wheels or redoubling 
the efforts of organisations and bodies already involved in the 
field. In other words: the 'S' should be integrated properly into 
GMES. 
In that sense finally, it is ~ e r t a i n l y a ~ p r o ~ r i a t e  to xpect that 
GMES will be a further manifestation of the transformation of 
the fundamental principle of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 
into practical realities: that space should be used "for the benefits 
and in the interests of all countries", both developing and 
developed, both spacefaring and non-spacefaring. 
